"The Environment and Directed Technical Change" by Acemoglu et al. (2012)

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Env Reading Group

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Research Question

- RQ: (i) What determines the direction of technical changes between dirty and clean sectors? (ii) What is the optimal environmental policy with directed technical change?
- Main contribution: the environmental policy implication of the directed technical change theory (Acemoglu, 2002)
- Main Results:
 - **1** The *market size* effect encourages innovation towards the larger input sector, while the *price effect* directs innovation towards the sector with higher price.
 - When the two sectors are highly substitutable, immediate and decisive intervention is necessary. These policies need to be in place for only a temporary period.
 - Optimal environmental regulation should always use both carbon tax to control current emissions, and research subsidies to influence the direction of research.
 - 4 An environmental disaster is less likely when the dirty sector uses an exhaustible resource.

Setup

- Economy is populated by one unit of continuum of workers, one unit of continuum of scientists and a continuum of entrepreneurs.
- All households have preferences

$$\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \frac{1}{(1+\rho)^t} u(C_t, S_t) \tag{1}$$

 $S_t \in [0, \overline{S}]$: the quality of the environment with \overline{S} the quality without any human pollution.

• Assumption: When S reaches \overline{S} , the value of the marginal increase in environmental quality is small:

$$\frac{\partial u(C,\overline{S})}{\partial S}=0$$

Setup

• Final goods production:

$$Y_{t} = \left(Y_{ct}^{\frac{\epsilon-1}{\epsilon}} + Y_{dt}^{\frac{\epsilon-1}{\epsilon}}\right)^{\frac{\epsilon}{\epsilon-1}} \tag{2}$$

 ϵ : elasticity of substitution between two sectors. $\epsilon > 1$, substitutes; $\epsilon < 1$, complements.

Intermediate goods production:

$$Y_{jt} = L_{jt}^{1-\alpha} \int_{0}^{1} A_{jit}^{1-\alpha} x_{jit}^{\alpha} di, \quad j \in \{c, d\}$$
 (3)

 A_{jit} : the quality of machine of type i used in sector j;

 x_{jit} : the quantity of machine of type i used in sector j;

 L_{it} : the quantity of labor used in sector j;

Setup

- Producing one unit of machine costs ψ units of final goods. $\psi = \alpha^2$.
- At the beginning of every period, each scientist decides whether to direct her research to clean or dirty technology;
- She is randomly allocated to one machine and is successful in innovation with probability $\eta_j \in (0,1)$, where innovation increases the quality of a machine by a factor $1 + \gamma$;
- A successful scientist obtained a one-period patent and becomes the entrepreneur for the current period in the production of machine i;
- When innovation is not successful, monopoly rights are allocated randomly to an entrepreneur drawn from the pool of potential entrepreneurs, who then uses the old technology.

• The evolution of sector productivity:

$$A_{jt} = \int_{0}^{1} A_{jit} di$$

$$= \int_{0}^{1} \left\{ s_{jt} \left[\eta_{j} (1 + \gamma) A_{jit-1} + (1 - \eta_{j}) A_{jit-1} \right] + (1 - s_{jt}) A_{jit-1} \right\} di$$

$$= (1 + \gamma \eta_{j} s_{jt}) A_{jit-1}$$
(4)

 s_{jt} is the mass of scientists working on machines in sector $j \in \{c, d\}$.

The quality of environment evolves

$$S_{t+1} = \min \left\{ \max \left[-\xi Y_{dt} + (1+\delta)S_t \right] \right\}$$
 (5)

• **Definition**: An environmental disaster occurs if $S_t = 0$ for some $t < \infty$.

Laissez-Faire Equilibrium

• Final goods producers' optimization:

$$\max_{Y_{dt}, Y_{ct}} Y_t - p_{dt} Y_{dt} - p_{ct} Y_{ct}$$

$$\Rightarrow p_{jt} = \left(\frac{Y_{jt}}{Y_t}\right)^{-1/\epsilon}$$
(6)

Input producers' optimization:

$$\max_{x_{jit}, L_{jt}} \quad p_{jt} L_{jt}^{1-\alpha} \int_{0}^{1} A_{jit}^{1-\alpha} x_{jit}^{\alpha} di - w_{t} L_{jt} - \int_{0}^{1} p_{jit} x_{jit} di$$

$$\Rightarrow x_{jit} = \left(\frac{\alpha p_{jt}}{p_{jit}}\right)^{1/(1-\alpha)} A_{jit} L_{jit}$$
 (7)

$$\Rightarrow w_t = (1 - \alpha) p_{jit} L_{jt}^{-\alpha} \int_0^1 A_{jit}^{1-\alpha} x_{jit}^{\alpha} di$$
 (8)

Laissez-Faire Equilibrium

Machine producers' optimization:

$$\max_{p_{jit}, x_{jit}} (p_{jit} - \psi) x_{jit}$$
s.t.
$$x_{jit} = \left(\frac{\alpha p_{jt}}{p_{jit}}\right)^{1/(1-\alpha)} A_{jit} L_{jt}$$

$$\Rightarrow p_{jit} = \frac{\psi}{\alpha} = \alpha$$
(9)

ullet The equilibrium profit of machine producers with technology A_{jit} is

$$\pi_{jit} = (1 - \alpha)\alpha p_{jt}^{\frac{1}{1 - \alpha}} L_{jt} A_{jit}$$
 (10)

 \bullet The expected profits for a scientist engaged in sector j is

$$\Pi_{jt} = \frac{\eta_j}{\eta_j} \int_0^1 (1 - \alpha) \alpha \rho_{jt}^{\frac{1}{1 - \alpha}} L_{jt} (1 + \gamma) A_{jit-1} di$$

$$= \eta_j (1 - \gamma) (1 - \alpha) \alpha \rho_{jt}^{\frac{1}{1 - \alpha}} L_{jt} A_{jt-1}$$
(11)

Directed Technical Change

$$\frac{\Pi_{ct}}{\Pi_{dt}} = \frac{\eta_c}{\eta_d} \underbrace{\left(\frac{p_{ct}}{p_{dt}}\right)^{1/(1-\alpha)}}_{\text{price effect}} \underbrace{\left(\frac{L_{ct}}{L_{dt}}\right)}_{\text{market size effect}} \underbrace{\left(\frac{A_{ct-1}}{A_{dt-1}}\right)}_{\text{productivity effect}}$$
(12)

- Productivity effect pushes innovation towards the sector with higher productivity;
- Price effect encourages innovation towards the sector with higher prices;
- Market size effect encourages innovation in the sector with greater market for machines.

Laissez-Faire Equilibrium

$$\frac{p_{ct}}{p_{dt}} = \left(\frac{A_{ct}}{A_{dt}}\right)^{-(1-\alpha)}, \quad \frac{L_{ct}}{L_{dt}} = \left(\frac{A_{ct}}{A_{dt}}\right)^{-\varphi}, \quad \varphi \equiv (1-\alpha)(1-\epsilon) \underbrace{<}_{\epsilon>1} 0$$

$$\frac{\Pi_{ct}}{\Pi_{dt}} = \frac{\eta_c}{\eta_d} \left(\frac{1 + \gamma \eta_c s_{ct}}{1 + \gamma \eta_d s_{dt}} \right)^{-(1+\varphi)} \left(\frac{A_{ct-1}}{A_{dt-1}} \right)^{-\varphi}$$
(13)

Lemma

Under laissez-faire, it is an equilibrium for innovation at time t to occur

- ullet only in the clean sector $\Rightarrow \left(rac{A_{ct-1}}{A_{dt-1}}
 ight)^{-arphi} > rac{\eta_d}{\eta_c}(1+\gamma\eta_c)^{1+arphi}$
- ullet only in the dirty sector $\Rightarrow \left(rac{A_{dt-1}}{A_{ct-1}}
 ight)^{-arphi} > rac{\eta_c}{\eta_d}(1+\gamma\eta_d)^{1+arphi}$
- in both sectors $\Rightarrow \left(\frac{A_{ct-1}}{A_{dt-1}}\right)^{-\varphi} = \frac{\eta_d}{\eta_c} \left(\frac{1+\gamma\eta_c s_{ct}}{1+\gamma\eta_d s_{dt}}\right)^{(1+\varphi)}$

Environmental Disaster

 $\bullet \ \, \text{Assumption:} \ \, \frac{A_{c0}}{A_{d0}} < \min \left\{ \left(1 + \gamma \eta_c \right)^{-\frac{\varphi+1}{\varphi}} \left(\frac{\eta_c}{\eta_d} \right)^{1/\varphi}, \left(1 + \gamma \eta_d \right)^{\frac{1+\varphi}{\varphi}} \left(\frac{\eta_c}{\eta_d} \right)^{1/\varphi} \right\}$

Proposition

Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. Then there exists a unique laissez-faire equilibrium where innovation always occurs in the dirty sector only, and the long-run growth rate of dirty input production is $\gamma \eta_d$. The laissez-faire equilibrium always leads to an environmental disaster.

- Innovation starts in the dirty sector \Rightarrow only A_dt grows, which further increases the technical gap.
- ullet Dirty input production grows at the same rate as A_{dt} in the long run

$$Y_{dt} = \frac{A_{dt}}{\left(1 + \left(\frac{A_{dt}}{A_{ct}}\right)^{\varphi}\right)^{\frac{\alpha + \varphi}{\varphi}}} \tag{14}$$

Research Subsidy

• Suppose that the government can subsidize scientists to work in the clean sector with a rate q_t , then the expected profit from innovation in the clean sector is

$$\Pi_{ct} = (1+q_t)\eta_c(1+\gamma)(1-\alpha)\alpha p_{ct}^{1/(1-\alpha)} L_{ct} A_{ct-1}$$

- A sufficiently high subsidy to clean research can redirect innovation towards the clean sector;
- A temporary subsidy is sufficient to redirect all research to the clean sector: When the ratio A_{ct}/A_{dt} becomes sufficiently high, it will be profitable for scientists to direct their research to the clean sector even without the subsidy.

Research Subsidy

- A temporary subsidy is sufficient to avoid an environmental disaster when two inputs are strong substitutes ($\epsilon > 1/(1-\alpha)$): $\alpha + \varphi < 0$, Y_{dt} will not grow in the long run;
- A temporary subsidy cannot prevent an environmental disaster when two inputs are weak substitutes ($\epsilon \in (1,1/(1-\alpha))$): Even though A_{dt} is constant, Y_{dt} grows at the rate $(1+\gamma\eta_c)^{\alpha+\varphi}-1$
- As the average quality of clean machines increases, workers are reallocated towards the clean sector: $\frac{L_{ct}}{L_{dt}} = \left(\frac{A_{ct}}{A_{dt}}\right)^{-\varphi}$.
- The increase of the relative price of the dirty input encourages production of the dirty input.

Socially Optimal Allocation

- There are three kinds of externality:
 - the environmental externality exerted by dirty input producers;
 - 2 the knowledge externalities from R&D: scientists do not internalize the effects of their research on productivity in the future;
 - monopoly distortion;

Proposition

The socially optimal allocation can be implemented using a tax on dirty input (a carbon tax), a subsidy to clean innovation, and a subsidy for the use of all machines.

- The underutilization of machines due to monopoly is corrected by a subsidy for machines;
- The optimal carbon tax is equal to the social cost of carbon: the marginal cost of reducing
 the production of dirty input by one unit must be equal to the resulting marginal benefit in
 terms of higher environmental quality;
- The subsidy to clean sector allocates scientists to the sector with the higher social gain from innovation.



Socially Optimal Allocation

- By reducing production in the dirty sector, the carbon tax also discourages innovation in that sector.
- So why is a research subsidy to clean sector still necessary?
- Because using only the carbon tax to deal with two externalities will necessitate a higher carbon tax, distorting current production and reducing current consumption.


Structure of Optimal Environmental Regulation


Proposition

Suppose that $\epsilon > 1$ and ρ is sufficiently small. Then the optimal subsidy in the clean sector is temporary. Moreover, if $\epsilon > 1/(1-\alpha)$, then the optimal carbon tax is temporary.


- An optimal policy requires avoiding a disaster.
- When the discount rate is sufficiently low, it is optimal to have positive long-run growth, which can be achieved by technical change in the production of the clean input, without growth in the production of the dirty input.
- Failing to allocate all research to clean innovation would reduce intertemporal welfare.


• Green: $\epsilon = 10, \rho = 0.015$; Blue: $\epsilon = 3, \rho = 0.001$; Red: $\epsilon = 3, \rho = 0.015$





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


TABLE 2—WELFARE COSTS OF RELYING SOLELY ON CARBON TAX AS A FUNCTION OF THE ELASTICITY OF SUBSTITUTION AND THE DISCOUNT RATE

Elasticity of substitution ε	10		3	
Discount rate ρ	0.001	0.015	0.001	0.015
Welfare cost	1.02	1.66	1.92	3.15

Note: Percentage reductions in consumption relative to immediate intervention.

- Welfare loss is smaller when ϵ is higher: a relatively small carbon tax can redirect R&D towards clean technologies;
- Welfare loss is larger when ρ is higher: a higher discount rate puts greater weight on earlier periods.

References

Acemoglu, D. (2002). Directed technical change. *The review of economic studies*, 69(4):781–809.

Acemoglu, D., Aghion, P., Bursztyn, L., and Hemous, D. (2012). The environment and directed technical change. *American economic review*, 102(1):131–166.