# Discussion on "The Macroeconomics of Microfinance" by Buera et al. (2021)

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### Introduction

- Microfinance: credit targeted toward the poor who may otherwise lack access to financing.
- Empirical literature evaluating microfinance programs is limited to partial-equilibrium (PE) analysis:
  - (i) focuses on individual variations: the general equilibrium effects (i.e. globally increasing interest rate and wage) are removed by time fixed effect;
  - (ii) programs are small-scaled
- This paper evaluates both the PE and general-equilibrium (GE) aggregate and distributional effects.
  - quantitative dynamic general equilibrium model
- The paper shows that PE and GE effects are qualitatively and quantitatively different.

### Results Overview: Aggregate Effects

- PE: output and capital rises but the allocative efficiency suffers because more capital is allocated to entrepreneurs with below-average productivity, who benefit more directly from microfinance.
- GE: interest rate and wage increase. Capital stock decrease but TFP rises because higher factor prices limit the entry of low productivity entrepreneurs.

### Results Overview: Distributional Effects

- PE: the largest direct gains accrue to the poor (who take out microloans for consumption) and those who are marginal entrepreneurs (who take out microloans for production).
- GE: higher wages benefit workers (the poor) and higher interest rate benefits the wealthy through higher returns on their wealth. A small subset of entrepreneurs are worse off because lower profits.

### Model: Fundamental

• A measure *N* of infinitely lived individuals:

$$U = \mathbb{E}\left[\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t u(c_t)\right], \quad u(c_t) = \frac{c_t^{1-\sigma}}{1-\sigma}$$

- Three state variables: (a, x, z)
  - a: wealth
  - x: labor productivity,  $x \in \{x_l, x_h\}$ ,  $\pi_x$ : the probability of transferring types.
  - z: independently drawn from an invariant distribution  $\mu(z)$  with hazard rate  $1-\gamma$ .
- Each period, entrepreneurs choose to become a worker (wx) or an entrepreneur (zf(k, l) wl Rk):
  - Entrepreneurs: high z and low x

#### Model: Credit Constraint

Without microfinance, the incentive-compatible credit constraint is

$$\max_{l} \{zf(k,l) - wl\} - Rk + (1+r)a \ge (1-\phi) \left[ \max_{l} \{zf(k,l) - wl\} + (1-\delta)k \right]$$

The upper bound of capital:  $\bar{k}(a, z; \phi)$ ,  $\uparrow a, \uparrow z$ 

- (i) Individuals deposit wealth *a* and rent capital *k* at rate *R* from financial intermediaries.
- (ii) Credit constraint arises from imperfect enforcement of contract.
- (iii) Entrepreneurs may renege on capital rental contracts and keep a fraction of their economic resources.
- (iv) In the following period, the entrepreneurs regain access to financial markets and are not treated any differently.

### Model: Microfinance

- Microfinance: guarantee individuals' access to and repayment of financing up to  $b_{MF}$  with an interest rate spread v because enforcement is costly.
- Microfinance can be used for consumption or production as capital.
- Given the microfinance capital,  $k_{MF}$ , the credit constraint for conventonial capital is

$$\begin{split} & \max_{l} \{ z f(k_{MF} + k_{CL}, l) - w l \} - R k_{CL} + (1 + r) a \\ & \geq (1 - \phi) \left[ \max_{l} \{ z f(k_{MF} + k_{CL}, l) - w l \} + (1 - \delta) (k_{MF} + k_{CL}) \right] - (1 - \delta) k_{MF} \end{split}$$

 Everyone has access to microfinance, but not everyone will choose to use microfinance.

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# Value Functions

$$v(a, x, z) = \max\{v^{W}(a, x, z), v^{E}(a, x, z)\}$$

$$v^{W}(a,x,z) = \max_{c,a' \ge -b_{MF}} u(c) + \beta \mathbb{E}_{x',z'} [v'(a',x',z')|x,z]$$

s.t. 
$$c + a' \le wx + (1+r)a\mathbf{1}_{a \ge 0}(a) + (1+r_{\text{MF}})a\mathbf{1}_{a < 0}(a)$$
,

$$v^{E}(a, x, z) = \max_{c, a', k_{MF}, k_{CL}, l} u(c) + \beta \mathbb{E}_{x', z'} [v(a', x', z') | x, z]$$

$$k_{
m MF} + k_{
m CL}, l) - R_{
m MB}$$

s.t. 
$$c+a' \le zf(k_{\text{MF}}+k_{\text{CL}},l) - R_{\text{MF}}k_{\text{MF}} - Rk_{\text{CL}} - wl$$

$$(1+r)a\mathbf{1}_{a>0}(a)+(1+r)a\mathbf{1}_{a>0}(a)$$

$$\kappa_{\text{MF}} + \kappa_{\text{CL}}, \iota) - \kappa_{\text{MF}}$$

$$f(\mathbf{k}_{MF} + \mathbf{k}_{CL}, t) - \mathbf{k}_{MF} \mathbf{k}_{MF} - \mathbf{k}_{CL} - \mathbf{k}_{t}$$
  
  $+ (1+r)a\mathbf{1}_{a \ge 0}(a) + (1+r_{MF})a\mathbf{1}_{a < 0}(a)$ 

 $k_{\text{MF}} \leq k_{\text{MF}}(a;b_{\text{MF}}) \equiv b_{\text{MF}} + \min\{a,0\}$ 

$$(a)+(1+r)$$

$$(1+r_{\rm MF})a\mathbf{1}_a$$

$$+r_{\mathrm{MF}})a\mathbf{1}_{a<}$$

$$_{\mathrm{MF}})a\mathbf{1}_{a<0}(a)$$

(8)

(1)

(5)

(6)

$$\mathbf{F})a\mathbf{1}_{a<0}(a)$$

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$$+(1+r)a\mathbf{1}_{a\geq 0}(a)+(1+r)a\mathbf{1}_{a\geq 0}(a)$$

$$a' \ge -b_{\mathrm{MF}}$$
.

# Occupational Choice and Saving




Figure 1: Occupation and Saving Decisions

Occupation decision:  $(a, x, z) : \uparrow x, \uparrow z, \uparrow a$ 

# PE Aggregate Effects




Figure 2: PE Effects

TFP is determined by both intensive margin (the allocation of capital across entrepreneurs) and the extensive margin (the set of entrepreneurs operating)

# **GE** Aggregate Effects




Figure 3: GE Effects

### **Distributional Effects**




Figure 4: Distributional Effects

### Reference I

Buera, F. J., Kaboski, J. P., and Shin, Y. (2021). The macroeconomics of microfinance. *The Review of Economic Studies*, 88(1):126–161.